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I. INTRODUCTION
Headlines expressing outrage over tribal disenrollment abound.1
Most disenrollments are based on lineage2—evidence surfaces sug-
gesting that a tribal member’s ancestor was not actually enrolled or
eligible for enrollment—or political controversies, such as when one
faction within a tribe challenges the current leadership.3 In these con-
texts, most scholars argue that the solution to the disenrollment prob-
lem is to provide greater due process protections.4
There is a growing trend, however, to punish tribal members by
revoking their membership as a result of criminal convictions—or
even criminal conduct absent a conviction.5 Tribal disenrollment for
1. See, e.g., Lee Allen, Who Belongs? The Epidemic of Tribal Disenrollment, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 28, 2017), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/
native-news/belongs-epidemic-tribal-disenrollment/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6FV7-
FZKS]; Cecily Hilleary, Native American Tribal Disenrollment Reaching Epi-
demic Levels, VOICE AM. NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/native-
american-tribal-disenrollment-reaching-epidemic-levels/3748192.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/7TT3-A4SD]; Johnnie Jae, Tribal Disenrollment: The New Wave of
Genocide, NATIVE NEWS ONLINE (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.nativenewsonline
.net/opinion/tribal-disenrollment-the-new-wave-of-genocide/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/PX4W-3VLQ]; Brooke Jarvis, Who Decides Who Counts as Native Ameri-
can?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/mag-
azine/who-decides-who-counts-as-native-american.html (noting that Professor
David Wilkins estimates that between 5,000 and 9,000 tribal members have been
disenrolled over the past twenty years).
2. See, e.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 590 F.3d 751, 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2009); DAVID E.
WILKINS & SHELLY HULSE WILKINS, DISMEMBERED 108–14 (2017); Nina Shapiro,
Nooksack Tribe Boots Out 300 Members, Faces Showdown with Feds, SEATTLE
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/northwest/
nooksack-tribe-disenrolling-hundreds-in-high-stakes-showdown-with-feds/
[https://perma.unl.edu/CAA5-3CU9].
3. See, e.g., Quair v. Sisco (Quair I), 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955, 977 (E.D. Cal. July 26,
2004) (finding the court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenges by a
tribal member who led a successful recall of tribal leaders and was subsequently
disenrolled); Brown v. Garcia, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910, 911, 917 (Ct. App. 2017)
(dismissing on sovereign immunity grounds a suit challenging disenrollment of
members involved in a “decades-long backdrop of disputes over Tribal
leadership”).
4. See, e.g., WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 60; Angela R. Riley, Good (Native)
Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1074, 1108 (2007); Deron Marquez, Citi-
zenship, Disenrollment & Trauma, 53 CAL. W. L. REV. 181, 183, 196–97 (2017);
Formal Ethics Op. No. 1: Duties of Tribal Court Advocates to Ensure Due Process
Afforded to All Individuals Targeted for Disenrollment, NAT’L NATIVE AM. BAR
ASS’N 1 (2015), http://www.nativeamericanbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
Formal-Opinion-No.-1.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8L3B-624E].
5. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 20. This trend may extend beyond Indian
tribes; Britain apparently stripped citizenship from two ISIS fighters known as
“the Beatles” who are accused of torturing and beheading several civilians, in-
cluding Americans. See Adam Goldman et al., Britain Presses U.S. to Avoid Death
Penalty for ISIS Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/02/28/us/politics/britain-death-penalty-isis.html.
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criminal conduct has not attracted the same attention and does not
provoke the same ire as lineage-based or political-based disenroll-
ment. Commentators and tribal members themselves seem to take for
granted that it is proper for tribes to disenroll members for criminal
convictions or “bad” conduct.6
This Article argues that tribal disenrollment for criminal conduct
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Indian
Civil Rights Act.7 This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I traces the
development of the cruel and unusual punishment doctrine, which es-
tablished that the United States cannot revoke citizenship as a result
of criminal conduct.8 In Trop v. Dulles,9 the Supreme Court held that
the federal statute resulting in loss of citizenship was unconstitu-
tional, even though the underlying criminal conviction was wartime
desertion.10 In the sixty years since Trop, the Court has found that a
growing number of punishments qualify as “cruel and unusual” be-
cause they offend the “dignity of man” based on “evolving standards of
decency.”11
Part II explains that, although federal constitutional limitations
are not generally applicable to American Indian tribes, the Indian
Civil Rights Act extends certain Bill of Rights protections and makes
them expressly applicable to tribes.12 The prohibition on cruel and un-
usual punishment is one of those protections.13
The various methods used by tribes both historically and currently
to punish members engaged in criminal activity are described in Part
III. Historically, tribes responded to criminal (or other anti-social) con-
duct with peacekeeping and restorative justice mechanisms aimed at
solving the underlying problem and restoring harmony.14 In extreme
cases, banishment—prohibiting a tribal member from being present
on all or a portion of tribal lands—was used both to incapacitate and
6. See, e.g., WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 156; Marc Cooper, Tribal Flush:
Pechanga People “Disenrolled” en Masse, L.A. WKLY. (Jan. 2, 2008), http://www
.laweekly.com/news/tribal-flush-pechanga-people-disenrolled-en-masse-2151380
[https://perma.unl.edu/LQJ2-K3MJ] (arguing that disenrollment was improper
and noting that the disenrolled members “were accused of no crime, no misbehav-
ior, no wrongdoing, no disloyalty”); Jae, supra note 1 (asserting that tribal mem-
bers should not be disenrolled “unless they are found to be dually enrolled or
their criminal behavior poses an ongoing threat to their tribal communities” be-
cause these “are the only two instances in which the revocation of tribal member-
ship should be tolerated”).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(A) (2012).
8. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 88.
11. Id. at 101; see infra notes 73–85 and accompanying text.
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(A) (2012).
14. See infra notes 123–132 and accompanying text.
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rehabilitate the offender.15 However, banishment was almost always
temporary. Many tribes have retained, or are returning to, historical
methods of addressing crime in Indian country, but many also employ
more traditional western responses to criminal conduct, such as ar-
rest, trial (or plea bargaining), and sentencing in a formal court of law,
with punishments including incarceration. Disenrollment—the per-
manent removal of a tribal member from tribal rolls—is a relatively
recent response to criminal activity, and one that is growing in both
consideration and use.16
Part IV argues that tribal disenrollment is equivalent to the loss of
citizenship. Citizens of tribal nations share a national identity, just as
Americans do. Citizenship entails significant tangible and intangible
features in both the tribal context and the federal context, including
providing individuals with a culture, an identity, and a community,
and distinguishing citizens from outsiders.
This Article concludes that although membership is within tribes’
sovereign powers, once a tribe decides to grant membership to an indi-
vidual, disenrollment imposed in response to criminal behavior consti-
tutes punishment forbidden by the Indian Civil Rights Act.17
Revoking citizenship for reasons other than mistake, fraud,18 or some
voluntary act relinquishing citizenship goes beyond the sovereign
power. Despite the reality that criminal conduct on most reservations
is a significant problem, Congress has significantly limited the availa-
ble tribal responses, and federal and state law enforcement has been
woefully inadequate at addressing the problem. Historically, tempo-
rary banishment has been one option, but the trend to permanently
disenroll tribal members (or consider disenrollment) as a means to
deal with criminal conduct is problematic.
How can tribes effectively combat crime on their reservations? This
Article suggests that consistent with their sovereign status, tribes
ought to have expanded criminal jurisdiction—at least over their own
members. This solution protects tribal members from cruel and unu-
sual punishment and, at the same time, provides a mechanism for
tribes to address the problem creating the impetus for disenrollment.
15. See infra notes 133–140 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 164–172 and accompanying text.
17. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(A)(7)(a).
18. Sovereigns, including tribal governments, retain the limited implied right to re-
voke citizenship because of fraud or mistake; that right is part of the inherent
right to grant citizenship. See, e.g., Snowden v. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe
of Michigan, No. 04-CA-1017, 32 Indian L. Rep. 6047 (App. Ct. Saginaw Chip-
pewa Indian Tribe of Mich. Jan. 7, 2005), as reprinted in MATTHEW L.M.
FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 253, 258 (Been et al. eds., 2011).
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II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION ON CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The text of the Eighth Amendment states simply that “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”19 The U.S. Supreme Court has strug-
gled to interpret this phrase. As noted by one scholar, “the Court’s
treatment of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” has been
described “as ‘embarrassing,’ ‘ineffectual and incoherent,’ a ‘mess,’ and
a ‘train wreck.’”20
Despite this uncertainty, a few key principles are evident in the
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. First, although retribution
and deterrence are legitimate penal interests,21 the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment means that even convicted criminals
are entitled to “civilized treatment” respecting the “dignity of man.”22
Second, punishments that were appropriate even fifty years ago may
not be today, as the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society.”23 As communities (local, national, and international)
come to view certain punishments as inappropriate under any circum-
stances, those punishments are deemed “cruel and unusual.”24 Third,
drawing on these principles of civilized treatment respecting the dig-
nity of man, using evolving standards of decency and recognizing some
punishments are never proper, an individual cannot be stripped of his
U.S. citizenship as a result of criminal conduct.25
The Supreme Court only declared one punishment cruel and unu-
sual in violation of the Eighth Amendment before 1958.26 Admittedly,
the opportunities for the Court to consider the issue were limited, in
large part because most punishments were meted out at the state and
local level, and the Eighth Amendment was not held to apply to states
until 1962.27 But cruel and unusual was a difficult standard to meet.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual: The Eighth Amendment as
a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2008) (citations
omitted).
21. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding a death sentence for
murder).
22. See infra notes 45–58 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
25. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
26. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) (holding as cruel and unusual a
punishment requiring twelve years in painful hand and feet irons at hard labor
for a fraud conviction).
27. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–68 (1962) (barring punishment under a
state statute that criminalized being a narcotics addict because the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment was applicable to
states via the Fourteenth Amendment), overruling Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S.
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In a 1910 case finding a punishment cruel and unusual, the facts were
extreme: a Coast Guard disbursing officer entered two false amounts
in the ship’s cash book and was sentenced to fifteen years of hard la-
bor with painful chains around his wrists and ankles.28 The Court
held, in Weems v. United States, that such a punishment was cruel
and unusual.29
The Court in Weems acknowledged that it had not yet decided what
punishments were cruel and unusual,30 then discussed at length con-
gressional intent,31 dicta from earlier decisions,32 the views of various
commentators,33 and state court decisions.34 The Court noted that “in-
human and barbarous” treatment (“torture and the like”) was implied
in the prohibition but also considered the possibility of a dispropor-
tionate sentence constituting cruel and unusual punishment.35 Ulti-
502, 510 (1915) (pointing out that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments “is a limitation upon the Federal government, not
upon the states”). As noted by Professor Sigler, “the federal courts were generally
not involved in regulating capital punishment, or much of local criminal justice
practice of any kind.” Mary Sigler, Principle and Pragmatism in the Death Pen-
alty Debate, 37 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 72, 73 (2018).
28. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364. He was also fined and ordered to pay court costs and
subject to “(1) civil interdiction; (2) perpetual absolute disqualification; [and]
(3) . . . surveillance during life.” Id.
29. Id. at 381.
30. Id. at 368.
31. Id. at 368–69.
32. Id. at 368–71; see, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134–36 (1878) (concluding
that, despite the challenge being to a state punishment, execution by shooting—
as opposed to hanging—was not a cruel and unusual punishment for murder
“within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment” but “it is safe to affirm that pun-
ishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden . . . .”); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475, 479–80 (1866) (declining
to consider the merits because the Eighth Amendment applied only to the federal
government but stating, with regard to a fine of $50 and three months imprison-
ment at hard labor for selling alcohol illegally, “[w]e perceive nothing excessive,
or cruel, or unusual in this”); O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (declin-
ing to consider the issue because the Eighth Amendment did not apply to state
sentences but positing that being confined to hard labor for fifty-four years for
307 offenses of unlawful sale of liquor was not cruel and unusual).
33. Weems, 217 U.S. at 371–75.
34. Id. at 375–80 (noting that the federal constitutional limitation of cruel and unu-
sual punishment was not before those state tribunals).
35. Id. at 368, 370, 380 (noting that as compared to the offense committed in Weems,
there are “degrees of homicide that are not punished so severely,” along with a
number of other crimes). The Court added that “it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense,” id. at
356–57, although proportionality is generally no longer considered in determin-
ing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual outside of the death penalty con-
text. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (upholding a twenty-
five-year sentence for stealing three golf clubs under a recidivist statute); Rum-
mel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence for
a recidivist despite his three non-violent crimes resulting in fraud of less than
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mately, the Court determined that the sentence imposed “exhibits a
difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised
under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish jus-
tice.”36 Significantly, the Eighth Amendment is not static but is “pro-
gressive” and “may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice.”37 The Court concluded that the
punishment imposed in this case for fraud “amaze[s] those who have
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending
citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths.”38
Yet, despite finding only one violation of the Eighth Amendment in
almost two centuries, in 1958, the Supreme Court held that loss of
citizenship as punishment for a crime constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.39 In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court considered
whether “forfeiture of citizenship” by a natural-born U.S. citizen, who
was convicted by court-martial of wartime desertion, was constitu-
tional.40 In Trop, a soldier escaped from a stockade during World War
II and was recaptured.41 He was convicted of desertion, sentenced to
hard labor for three years, and dishonorably discharged.42 Eight years
later, he applied for a passport and was denied based upon a federal
statute that provided for loss of citizenship following conviction by
court-martial of desertion and dishonorable discharge from the
military.43
The Court’s emphasis on civilized treatment was explicit: the
power to punish must be “exercised within the limits of civilized stan-
dards.”44 The Trop Court focused on the mode of punishment imposed,
concluding that fines and imprisonment—and even the death pen-
alty—“may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but
any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is con-
stitutionally suspect.”45 It considered “whether this penalty subjects
the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.”46 The Court concluded that
$250). And rather than being considered cruel, some harsh sentences were ap-
plauded, at least in dicta. See, e.g., Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903)
(refusing to find prison sentences of seven and ten years for defendants convicted
of fraud cruel, noting that if “the effect of this sentence is to induce like criminals
to avoid its territory, North Carolina is to be congratulated, not condemned”).
36. Weems, 217 U.S. at 381.
37. Id. at 378.
38. Id. at 356–57.
39. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
40. Id. at 87.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 88.
43. Id.; Nationality Act of 1940 § 401(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1942) (repealed 1952).
44. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
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denationalization is a cruel and unusual punishment,47 despite explic-
itly acknowledging that the crime for which the defendant was con-
victed, wartime desertion, could be punished by death.48 Even though
the death penalty is constitutional,49 not every penalty short of death
complies with the Constitution.50
The Court explained the severity of denationalization: “There may
be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is
instead the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized so-
ciety. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it
destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in
the development.”51 “Civil death,” whereby a person loses most or all
civil rights and is “outside the law’s protection,”52 is simply unaccept-
able for criminal conduct.53
Furthermore, the “basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”54 The Court concluded
that denationalization is
offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects
the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not
what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may
be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his
native land may be terminated.55
47. Id. at 101.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 373 (1993) (upholding the death penalty
for an offender who was nineteen years old when he committed murder); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (finding that the death penalty is not per se
cruel and unusual punishment). The constitutionality of the death penalty has,
however, been limited in recent years. See infra notes 73–81 and accompanying
text.
50. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (“[T]he existence of the death penalty is not a license to the
Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its
imagination.”).
51. Id. at 103. For Native American tribal members, this “political existence” was in
the making for even more centuries than for Trop.
52. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1821 (2012) (“Trop and Weems make clear
that profound impairment of legal personality is constitutionally significant.”).
53. See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Defensible Disenfranchisement, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1725,
1738–39 (2014) (arguing in favor of voting rights exclusions for felons but re-
jecting permanent “civil death,” acknowledging that “restored political participa-
tion” is essential to a liberal democracy).
54. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added); see also Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039,
1048, 1053 (2017) (citations omitted) (vacating a death sentence because the
Eighth Amendment “reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity
of all persons”); William W. Berry III & Meghan J. Ryan, Cruel Techniques, Unu-
sual Secrets, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 413 (2017) (noting that one facet of the “dignity
requirement” is “humanness”).
55. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
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Denationalization may subject the individual “to banishment, a fate
universally decried by civilized people,”56 and resulted in Trop being
rendered effectively “stateless.”57 The fact that a person might not be
actually removed from the country is irrelevant; the threat alone
“makes the punishment obnoxious.”58
The Court also emphasized that the Eighth Amendment is not
static;59 it “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”60 The Court deter-
mined these evolving standards of decency in part by reviewing
international consensus61 and noted that the “civilized nations of the
world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed
as punishment for crime,”62 and in the United States, “the Eighth
Amendment forbids that to be done.”63 The Court more recently has
described the need to consider “objective indicia”64 of “contemporary
56. Id.
57. Id. (noting that Trop was left “stateless, a condition deplored in the international
community of democracies”). The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact
that Trop remained in the United States, ostensibly unaware that he had even
lost his citizenship, for eight years after the conviction triggering that loss.
58. Id.
59. As noted by the Supreme Court more recently, courts are not limited to “those
practices condemned by the common law in 1789.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 406, 418 (1986) (holding a prisoner sentenced to death was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing in federal court to challenge his “competence to be
executed”).
60. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added).
61. Domestic and international consensus have been criticized as a means of inter-
preting U.S. constitutional guarantees such as the Eighth Amendment, which
was designed to guard against majority rule. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, Interna-
tional Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 63, 67 (2007) (arguing that international consensus should not carry “any
persuasive weight in judging whether the juvenile death penalty is unconstitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment”); Sigler, supra note 27, at 80–81; Stin-
neford, supra note 20, at 1754. Simply counting states (and countries) that permit
or forbid certain practices and reviewing trends in those practices is problematic.
Yet the Court continues to follow this approach and simply notes that its own
“judgment”—whereby the Court asks whether there is reason to disagree with
the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators sufficiently diminishes
these risks. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
62. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
63. Id. at 103. As the Court noted,
His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he hap-
pens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights,
and presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy
the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is state-
less. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien
might be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In
short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.
Id. at 101–02.
64. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005) (holding that execution of juveniles
was cruel and unusual).
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values”65 when determining whether a punishment comports with the
evolving standards of decency such that it does not offend standards of
civilized treatment.
Finally, Chief Justice Warren pointed out that even if the govern-
ment had the regulatory power to divest individuals of their citizen-
ship,66 denationalization in this case was used as punishment.67 It
was thus distinguishable from statutes that, for example, create eligi-
bility for voting and exclude felons.68 The Court pointed out that Army
soldiers were explicitly warned about this potential punishment,69
and even though desertion is a serious offense, soldiers were regularly
convicted of the crime.70 Citizenship “is not subject to the general
powers of the National Government and therefore cannot be divested
65. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (noting that in addition to “the
barbarous methods generally outlawed in the 18th century,” the Court “takes
into account objective evidence of contemporary values before determining
whether a particular punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity
that the Amendment protects”).
66. Trop, 356 U.S. at 94. The Court distinguished Trop from another loss of citizen-
ship case decided by the Court the same day which permitted denationalization
for voting in a foreign election. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958), over-
ruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). The Court pointed out that “the
fact that deportation and denaturalization for fraudulent procurement of citizen-
ship may be imposed for purposes other than punishment affords no basis for
saying that in this case denationalization is not a punishment.” Trop, 356 U.S. at
98–99.
67. Trop, 356 U.S. at 96–97 (noting that the “purpose of taking away citizenship from
a convicted deserter is simply to punish him” and “no other legitimate purpose,”
such as “solving international problems,” could be served by the statute). As
noted by the Court,
Plainly legislation prescribing imprisonment for the crime of desertion is
penal in nature. If loss of citizenship is substituted for imprisonment, it
cannot fairly be said that the use of this particular sanction transforms
the fundamental nature of the statute. In fact, a dishonorable discharge
with consequent loss of citizenship might be the only punishment meted
out by a court-martial.
Id. at 97.
68. Id. at 96 (pointing out that “a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes
a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental
purpose”); see also Sigler, supra note 53, at 1726, 1728 (noting that in the United
States, “felon disenfranchisement is formally regulatory, not punitive” and argu-
ing that “regulatory disenfranchisement is not the ‘civil death’ of an earlier era or
a modern mechanism for permanent political exclusion”).
69. Trop, 356 U.S. at 97.
70. Id. at 90.
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in the exercise of those powers.”71 In short, “[c]itizenship is not a li-
cense that expires upon misbehavior.”72
Since Trop, the Court has continued to narrow the scope of accept-
able punishments, especially in the death penalty context, insisting
that “death is different.”73 For example, despite repeatedly upholding
the death penalty until 1972,74 the Court invalidated all mandatory
capital sentencing schemes in 1976.75 The Court then held that the
death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when im-
posed for the non-fatal rape of an adult, even when the offender com-
mitted the crime after escaping from a correctional facility where he
was incarcerated for a prior murder, rape, kidnaping, and aggravated
assault.76 Five years later, the Court held that the death penalty
could not be applied when the offender was convicted of felony murder
but “the defendant did not commit the homicide, was not present
when the killing took place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme
to murder”77—he was the getaway driver for a planned robbery.78 In
71. Id. at 92. As aptly noted by one commentator:
[E]ven if the state can legitimately punish the deserter, the Court con-
cluded that expatriation was too harsh a punishment. Lurking in the
background, of course, is the question as to why we should stop at deser-
tion. Why not expatriate murderers? Or rapists? Or, more in tune with
the current zeitgeist, drug dealers, or even drug users?
Leo Zaibert, Uprootedness as (Cruel and Unusual) Punishment, 11 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 384, 389 (2008).
72. Trop, 356 U.S. at 92.
73. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002) (reversing a death sentence
when the aggravating factors were found by judge, not jury); Jeffrey Abramson,
Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 117 (2004).
74. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 185–86 (1971) (affirming death
sentences issued by juries in their “absolute discretion”). In 1972, the Court inval-
idated “all existing state capital sentencing schemes” because they “afforded deci-
sion makers too much discretion.” Sigler, supra note 27, at 74 (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). After states amended their statutes to address the
Court’s concerns, the Court upheld death penalty statutes that provided “guided
discretion.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199, 207 (1976).
75. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303, 305 (1976) (holding that the “char-
acter and record” of each defendant should be considered prior to imposing a
death sentence). As noted by Professor Sigler, despite the fact that a “majority of
justices rejected the notion that capital punishment was cruel and unusual per
se, . . . ‘fundamental respect for humanity . . . requires consideration of the char-
acter and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particu-
lar offense.’” Sigler, supra note 27, at 74–75 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).
76. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 599 (1977) (reversing a death sentence be-
cause it was “a disproportionate punishment for rape”). The Court reached this
conclusion after denying certiorari on this exact issue fourteen years earlier in
Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), over the dissent of three justices who
argued that only five countries permit the death penalty under these
circumstances.
77. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 795 (1982).
78. Id. at 797.
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the last ten years, the Court has held that the death penalty cannot be
imposed for any non-fatal offense, even the rape of an eight-year-old
child.79 In addition to the nature of the offense, an offender’s dimin-
ished capacity is also relevant; the Court has held in the past twenty
years that the death penalty cannot be applied to mentally incompe-
tent80 and juvenile81 offenders.
Even in non-death penalty cases, the Court has signaled a greater
willingness to find punishments cruel and unusual in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. For example, the Court recently held that
juveniles cannot be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide
offenses82 and cannot be mandatorily issued that sentence, even for
murder.83 In each of these cases, the Court struck down the punish-
ment imposed despite the seriousness of the crime.84 Focusing on the
“evolving standards of decency,” the Court has found punishments
cruel and unusual even when they were considered constitutionally
acceptable only a decade or two earlier.85
79. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008) (concluding that the death
penalty must be reserved, “at this stage of evolving standards . . . for crimes that
take the life of the victim”).
80. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that, in light of “evolving
standards of decency,” the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing a “mentally
retarded offender”), overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (con-
cluding that “at present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus
against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to
conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment”). The
death penalty also cannot constitutionally be applied to insane prisoners, even
when competent at the time of the crime. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
417–18 (1986).
81. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
bars imposing the death penalty on all juvenile offenders), overruling Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (explaining that because “we discern neither
a historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital
punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age,” that punish-
ment “does not offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment”).
82. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 69 (2010) (reversing a life sentence imposed
for armed burglary and attempted armed robbery for a sixteen-year-old offender
because “when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability”).
83. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (reversing life without parole
sentences for two fourteen-year-old defendants because “the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders”).
84. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 597 (1977) (noting that rape is a
serious crime and “highly reprehensible”).
85. See, e.g., Stinneford, supra note 20, at 1741. Even with similar facts, and without
generally overruling earlier cases holding the opposite, the Court reached a dif-
ferent result—arguably because the “evolving standards of decency” did not com-
pel the finding of cruel and unusual punishment in the earlier cases but have
done so in the newer cases.
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In short, the Eighth Amendment requires that punishments com-
port with “civilized treatment” as determined through objective evi-
dence of community standards that reflect the “evolving standards of
decency.” Punishments that do not comply with this standard—in-
cluding stripping an individual of citizenship—are beyond the govern-
ment’s power to inflict. In this way, the “Eighth Amendment’s
protection of dignity reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we
are, and the Nation we aspire to be. This is to affirm that the Nation’s
constant, unyielding purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so
that its precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force.”86
III. THE PROHIBITION ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT APPLIES TO TRIBES VIA THE
INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The Eighth Amendment does not directly apply to Indian tribes; as
sovereign nations, they have general plenary power over their citi-
zens.87 However, because of the complex relationship between the
U.S. government and tribes, tribes are subject to congressional
power.88
Beginning in 1961, Congress’s Senate Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights conducted a multi-year investigation focusing on the
constitutional rights of Native Americans.89 Pursuant to the 1924 Cit-
izenship Act, federal citizenship was granted to Indians who had not
already acquired citizenship via treaty or some other method.90 The
subcommittee acknowledged that Indian tribes are “quasi-sovereign
entities possessing all the inherent rights of sovereignty except where
86. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (reversing a death sentence when the
state set an I.Q. floor based on outdated scientific evidence for mental incapacity).
87. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (acknowledging that
tribes are “separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution” and as such, they
“have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those Constitutional provi-
sions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority”); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383 (1898) (recognizing the Cherokee tribe’s “autonomous
existence” and holding the Fifth Amendment was not applicable in tribal prosecu-
tions of their own members, even after enactment of the Major Crimes Act); see
also Riley, supra note 4, at 1050 (noting that tribes are “free to be illiberal” and
federal constitutional limitations do not automatically apply to them).
88. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) (affirming, pursuant to
congressional action, the federal criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who mur-
dered a member of the same tribe); Talton, 163 U.S. at 384 (“[A]lthough pos-
sessed of these attributes of local self-government when exercising their tribal
functions, all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authority of the
United States.”).
89. Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Summary Report of Hearings and
Investigations on S. Res. 265 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2 (1964) [hereinafter Summary Report].
90. Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
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restrictions have been placed thereon by the United States itself,”91
but at least some members believed that citizenship92 should entitle
Indians to “every protection and guarantee accorded to all other citi-
zens of the United States.”93 Congress expressed two main concerns.
First, the lack of a procedural remedy—including an effective appeal
system—to challenge potential violations of tribal members’ rights,94
was troubling. Second, as noted by the Tenth Circuit, the “tribal ad-
ministration of justice and imposition of tribal penalties and forfeit-
ures”95 was a significant concern, suggesting criminal penalties
should be examined closely.
At the same time, as part of the broader civil rights movement,
Congress struggled to battle discrimination against a variety of minor-
ity groups.96 Despite making some progress while concentrating on
inner-city minority groups, there was concern that “the original inhab-
itants of the North American continent”97 were continuing to be de-
prived of foundational constitutional protections98—at least in part
from their own tribal governments.99 The congressional Subcommit-
tee noted that the rights of Native Americans varied whether they
91. Summary Report, supra note 89, at 2 (quoting Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,
231 F.2d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1956)).
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012).
93. Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearing on S. Res. 53 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.
2 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 Hearings].
94. Summary Report, supra note 89, at 6, 16, 18.
95. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971) (discussing the Indian
Civil Rights Act). The court’s perspective, however, was complicated at best; it
claimed that “the Cherokee’s high degree of civilization (compared with other In-
dian tribes) was probably due to their own inherent character and the fact that
many of their purebloods intermarried with fine members of Scotch families, and
pureblood Cherokees intermarried with half-blood or less than half-blood Cher-
okees.” Id. at 676.
96. 1961 Hearings, supra note 93, at 4 (statement of Sen. Keating).
97. Id.
98. The subcommittee made a number of proposals to Congress which were “designed
to insure that Indian citizens receive the inalienable rights guaranteed to all citi-
zens of this country,” including that “the constitutional rights and protections
conferred upon American citizens should be made applicable to American Indians
in their relationship with their tribal governing bodies.” Summary Report, supra
note 89, at 23. The subcommittee also recommended that Native Americans who
alleged violations of constitutional protections in criminal proceedings would be
able to appeal the conviction to the federal courts, but that recommendation was
not adopted. Id.
99. Summary Report, supra note 89, at 4; see also NAT’L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES
ASS’N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 12 (David H. Getches ed., 1978) [hereinaf-
ter Getches] (“Concern over some tribes’ abuses led to imposition of most Bill of
Rights requirements on all tribes.”).
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were on or off their reservation.100 The work of the Senate Subcom-
mittee was viewed as a significant step to rectify that by providing
federal constitutional protection to Native Americans just a few years
after the Civil Rights Act of 1964101 attempted to level the playing
field for racial minorities in the United States.102
In response to these concerns and after “a ‘long-line’ of federal
court decisions exempting Indian tribes from constitutional con-
straints,”103 in 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act.104
That Act incorporates some critical federal constitutional guarantees
of individual liberty and applies them to tribes.105 Although many In-
dians opposed enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act for tribal sov-
ereignty reasons,106 the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress
passed the Act in part to provide tribal members with more protection
from overreaching by their tribes.107 The purpose of the Act was to
protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal govern-
ments. This is accomplished by placing certain limitations on an Indian tribe
in the exercise of its powers of self-government. These limitations are the same
as those imposed on the Government of the United States by the United States
Constitution and on the States by judicial interpretation.108
The Indian Civil Rights Act included a prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.109 The Eighth Amendment states that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”110 The corresponding pro-
vision in the Indian Civil Rights Act states that no Indian tribe “shall
require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel and unu-
100. Summary Report, supra note 89, at 5 (internal citations omitted); see also WIL-
KINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 63 (noting that Native American rights may
vary”).
101. 41 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
102. Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearings on S. 961, S. 962, S. 963,
S. 964, S. 965, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968, and S.J. Res. 40 before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1 (1965).
103. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted); WIL-
KINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 63.
104. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2012).
105. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
106. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 63.
107. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62, 72 (1978) (stating that “Con-
gress’ authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad,” but holding that
the Indian Civil Rights Act “does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory
or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers” when a tribal member
challenged an ordinance prohibiting children from female members who married
outside the tribe from being eligible for enrollment).
108. S. REP. NO. 90-841, 5–6 (1967) (emphasis added). For a description of the Indian
Civil Rights Act’s legislative history, see Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 881–84 (2d Cir. 1996).
109. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(A).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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sual punishments.”111 When language in the Indian Civil Rights Act
is “virtually identical” to that of the similar constitutional provision,
the federal interpretations of that language control.112 This suggests
that federal court interpretations of the Eighth Amendment should
require the same result when applied to tribal punishment being chal-
lenged as violating the Indian Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment.
However, the Supreme Court also noted that one goal of the Indian
Civil Rights Act was to further tribal self-government.113 Courts have
acknowledged that Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act to
protect tribal sovereignty and cultural identity.114 Furthermore, stat-
utes should “be liberally construed in favor of the Indians and . . . all
111. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(A). At least one scholar has mentioned some of the “vexing
issues” that the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) has created, including whether
framing banishment (not disenrollment) as “cruel and unusual punishment”
might give federal courts jurisdiction to hear those cases. Patrice H. Kunesh,
Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M.
L. REV. 85, 107 (2007).
112. United States v. Fuentes, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150–51 (D. Or. 2011) (noting
that because “ICRA ‘imposes an identical limitation on tribal government conduct
as the Fourth Amendment,’ courts analyze the reasonableness of tribal police ac-
tivities under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”) (citing United States v.
Becerra–Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005); Tracy v. Superior Court,
810 P.2d 1030, 1047–48 (Ariz. 1991) (noting that although “certain provisions” of
the Indian Civil Rights Act “do not mirror those of the federal constitution and
have been interpreted somewhat differently from their federal counterparts,”
when the “provisions . . . clearly mirror the federal provisions in language and
intent,” they “have been interpreted under the federal standard and are generally
held to be identical to their federal counterparts”).
113. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62 (noting that two “distinct and competing purposes
are manifest in the provisions of the ICRA: in addition to its objective of strength-
ening the position of individual tribal members vis-a-vis the tribe, Congress also
intended to promote the well established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-
government’”) (citations omitted).
114. See, e.g., O’Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir.
1973) (requiring Indian plaintiffs suing under ICRA to exhaust tribal remedies
because it was clear “that Congress wished to protect and preserve individual
rights of the Indian peoples, with the realization that this goal is best achieved by
maintaining the unique Indian culture and necessarily strengthening tribal gov-
ernments”); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150–51 (D. S.D. 1974), re-
manded on other grounds 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975) (concluding that the
plaintiffs’ ICRA claims “must not be measured by the same standards imposed by
the Bill of Rights on state and federal governments, but rather these limitations
must be applied with recognition of the Oglala Sioux Tribe’s unique cultural heri-
tage, their experience in self government, and the disadvantages or burdens, if
any, under which the defendant tribal government was attempting to carry out
its duties”); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629, 633 (D. Utah 1973) (concluding
that ICRA’s “guarantees of individual rights should, where possible, be harmo-
nized with tribal cultural and governmental autonomy”).
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ambiguities are to be resolved in their favor.”115 Following this line of
reasoning, the federal constitutional protections made applicable to
tribal citizens should be judged by traditionally tribal, not federal,
standards.116 Whether analyzing the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment through federal interpretations or consistent with tradi-
tional tribal customs and practice, the result is the same: disenroll-
ment as punishment for criminal conduct violates that prohibition.
IV. TRIBAL PUNISHMENT
Tribes historically focused on peacekeeping. Hence, their response
to conflict was to address the underlying problem. The general prac-
tice was restorative justice, which “incorporates all stakeholders in a
specific crime—the offender, the victim, family members, community
representatives, and other interested parties—in a process of group
decision-making on how to respond to the crime and its implications
for the future.”117 Only in cases of extreme anti-social behavior that
115. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02(1), at 113
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) (citations omitted).
116. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 4, at 1050–51 (pointing out that tribes are free to be
“illiberal” and defy “American civil rights norms”). As a practical matter, lack of a
remedy under ICRA may pose a barrier to enforcing the protections it attempts to
provide to tribal members. This discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, but
ICRA provides only habeas relief. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. And although some courts
have concluded that disenrollment constitutes a “detention” for habeas purposes,
see, e.g., Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir.
1996); Quair I, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953–62 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2004) (concluding
that “disenrollment from tribal membership and subsequent banishment from
the reservation constitutes detention in the sense of a severe restriction on peti-
tioners’ liberty not shared by other members of the Tribe”), a number of courts
have held that disenrollment is not a “detention” for purposes of ICRA because it
is not a “severe actual or potential restraint on liberty.” See, e.g., Tavares v.
Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 871–72 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that “detention” under
§ 1303 of the Indian Civil Rights Act is more narrow than “custody,” and “tempo-
rary exclusion is not tantamount to a detention” and hence, the plaintiff had no
habeas remedy in response to a ten-year banishment order as discipline for circu-
lating a petition to recall several Tribal Council members); Jeffredo v. Macarro,
590 F.3d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 2009); Quair v. Sisco (Quair II), No. 1:02-CV-5891
DFL, 2007 WL 1490571, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2007). Arguably, when dis-
enrollment is employed as punishment (as opposed to the result of a political dis-
pute), that may suffice to create detention. And Professor Wilkins points out
courts’ “disturbing judicial logic,” stating that “Disenrollment is far more detri-
mental than banishment alone, because disenfranchisement is an absolute denial
of the legal, political, and cultural rights of a citizen; whereas banishment
alone—unless it is joined with disenrollment—is a physical expulsion from the
community but does not necessarily entail a loss of citizenship.” WILKINS & WIL-
KINS, supra note 2, at 138.
117. Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An Unex-
pected Benefit of Booker?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 787, 789 (2006). Of course, some
tribes (or at least some groups within tribes) were not always peacekeeping; yet
they had their own justice systems, and those systems were aimed at addressing
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threatened the community, such as murder or incest with a child, did
tribes consider banishing a member from tribal lands.118 But even
these orders were generally temporary, imposed with the expectation
that harmony would ultimately be restored. Over time, however,
tribes adopted more traditionally western criminal justice systems,
creating courts and jails to deal with criminal offenders.119
In recent years, in an attempt to address the recent drug epidemic
and in response to the lack of federal criminal prosecutions in Indian
Country,120 many tribal communities are exploring creative ways to
address crime on their reservations. One of the tools being adopted is
disenrollment—permanently removing tribal members from the tribal
rolls—for those involved in criminal activity.
A. Historical Methods of Addressing Criminal Conduct
Historically, tribes viewed anti-social conduct as a problem to be
solved rather than a crime to be punished.121 Tribes were generally
close-knit communities that depended heavily on internal harmony to
flourish122 and addressed anti-social or criminal behavior in ways
that best met their communities’ needs.123 Hence, their methods of
addressing problematic behavior tended to be reconciliatory, including
“peacemaking, mediation, restitution, ostracism, or negotiation.”124
Formal justice systems were uncommon.125 Although vengeance was
the underlying conflict. Western criminal justice systems were essentially thrust
upon tribes. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 20–25.
119. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 67.
120. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 144.
121. VINE DELORIA JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE
111 (1983) (“The primary goal was simply to mediate the case to everyone’s satis-
faction” rather than “to ascertain guilt and then bestow punishment upon the
offender.”); WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 25 (“[T]he spiritually cohesive
nature of tribal collectives and the assortment of informal sanctions that were in
place . . . generally worked to ensure peace and social order in the society.”);
Kunesh, supra note 111, at 95 (noting that the distinction between “civil or pri-
vate” wrongs on the one hand and “criminal or public” wrongs on the other were
often irrelevant; “any wrongdoing concerned the whole community”).
122. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 142 (noting that “Indigenous peoples had in
place customs, values, and ceremonies that protected the integrity and personal-
ity of each member of the community” and the goal was to “restore community
harmony”).
123. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 67.
124. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 142; see also, e.g., Associated Press, Dis-
enrollment Leaves Natives “Culturally Homeless,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 20, 2014),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/disenrollment-leaves-natives-culturally-home-
less/ [https://perma.unl.edu/42TQ-KPFB] (noting that historically, “ceremonies
and prayers—not disenrollment—were used to resolve conflicts because tribes es-
sentially are family-based, and ‘you don’t cast out your relatives’”).
125. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 67; WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 20.
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practiced,126 restitution (as opposed to retribution) was the primary
objective.127 For example, in the 1880s, Crow Dog, a Lakota (Sioux)
Indian, murdered Spotted Tail, another Lakota Indian.128 No formal
criminal proceeding occurred at the tribal level; restitution including
eight horses and cash was paid to the victim’s family.129 In cases such
as Crow Dog’s, resolving disputes “amenably through consensus”130
helped maintain harmony within the community.
In response to extreme criminal conduct (generally only murder or
incest), tribes sometimes banished a member.131 Banishment was “ex-
tremely rare”132 and employed only “as a last resort after exhausting
customary and traditional methods of social discipline and sanc-
tion,”133 because it destroyed the fundamental bonds within a
tribe.134 A banished tribal member was prohibited from being present
on all or a portion of tribal lands.135
Most significantly, banishment was historically imposed for a lim-
ited period of time in order to rehabilitate the offender and allow
peaceful reunification within the community.136 For example, when
Cries Yia Eya, a Cheyenne tribal member, killed Chief Eagle, the re-
maining chiefs banished him.137 Three years later, Cries Yia Eya re-
turned with tobacco for the chiefs, asking to be allowed to return.
126. Getches, supra note 99, at 9. In this vein, restorative justice scholars have been
criticized for “characterizing the relevant actors and cultures as imbued with
profound powers of forgiveness and mercy.” Douglas J. Sylvester, Myth in Restor-
ative Justice History, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 471, 475 (2003).
127. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 121, at 111–12 (“The system attempted to compen-
sate the victim and his or her family and to solve the problem in such a manner
that all could forgive and forget and continue to live within the tribal society in
harmony with one another”).
128. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883); FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 383.
129. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 383 (citations omitted).
130. Kunesh, supra note 111, at 94. Options available to Spotted Tail’s family included
killing Crow Dog, banishing him, or agreeing to restitution. FLETCHER, supra
note 18, at 383.
131. See, e.g., Kunesh, supra note 111, at 92–93; Riley, supra note 4, at 1103.
132. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 121, at 113.
133. Kunesh, supra note 111, at 92.
134. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 121, at 113.
135. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 4.
136. See, e.g., Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskratch, Curing the Tribal Dis-
enrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 395 (2015);
David E. Wilkins, Exiling One’s Kin: Banishment and Disenrollment in Indian
Country, 17 W. LEGAL HIST. 235, 245 (2004). Some scholars argue that banish-
ment, when applied “contextually as a traditional remedy for healing and restitu-
tion,” is an “effective restorative justice technique because it can potentially
return harmony to Native communities,” especially as a way to combat crime that
is often “unaddressed by the criminal justice system.” Riley, supra note 4, at
1105.
137. KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND
CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1941).
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After each segment of the tribe debated the proper outcome, they de-
cided to allow Cries Yia Eya to return and his behavior was markedly
improved.138
As scholars have noted, many tribes were “culturally averse to for-
mal systems of punishment.”139 Recognizing that modern justice sys-
tems are often insufficient, some tribes are returning to these historic
methods of addressing problems.140 In the last two decades, for exam-
ple, in the Organized Village of Kake, “Circle Peacemaking” reap-
peared, which “heals the offender by addressing the underlying causes
of the offending behavior and restores the rupture in community life
by repairing the relationship between the offender and the victim.”141
A number of individuals, including the offender and the victim along
with family and friends, “sit in a circle while a Keeper of the Circle
facilitates discussion.”142 The meeting ends when “forgiveness and
healing are apparent and consensus is reached about the offender’s
sentence.”143 Other tribes are returning to these more traditional
mechanisms for resolving disputes, recognizing that failing to include
the entire community is not an effective way to address wrongdo-
ing.144 In addition, some tribes have returned to using banishment
either in an attempt to heal and reconcile their community or as “a
reaction to the modern realities of tribal jurisdiction and reservation
life,” including the need to combat drug usage.145
B. Modern Methods of Addressing Criminal Conduct
Although tribes historically used conflict-resolution methods
aimed at restoring harmony to address anti-social behavior, coloniza-
tion and federal government control in Indian country have thrusted
formal westernized criminal justice systems on most tribes over the
past century.146
138. Id. at 12–13.
139. Kunesh, supra note 111, at 96.
140. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 67, 85.
141. Id. at 85.
142. Id.
143. Id. Those in the circle are also “responsible for ensuring that offenders adhere to
their sentence.” Id.
144. See generally Jessica Metoui, Returning to the Circle: The Reemergence of Tradi-
tional Dispute Resolution in Native American Communities, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL.
517 (2007).
145. Riley, supra note 4, at 1103–05; see also, e.g., Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey,
Tribes Revive Ancient Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2004), http://www.nytimes
.com/2004/01/18/us/plagued-by-drugs-tribes-revive-ancient-penalty.html (dis-
cussing the problems facing tribes today, including drug and alcohol use and
gambling, which is why tribes have brought back banishment).
146. Getches, supra note 99, at 8 (noting that, as part of the process to “civilize” tribes,
“destruction of the remaining authority of the traditional leaders and the systems
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1. Adoption of Western Notions of Criminal Punishment
Tribes retained exclusive criminal jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted by one Indian against another Indian within Indian country
until 1885, but from early in our nation’s history, the federal govern-
ment became progressively more involved in criminal justice affecting
tribes and tribal members. In 1817, Congress passed the Indian Coun-
try Crimes Act,147 making federal criminal laws applicable in Indian
country and subject to federal prosecution unless both the offender
and victim were Indian or, if the victim was not Indian, the offending
Indian was “punished by the law of the tribe.”148 In 1883, the Courts
of Indian Offenses were created and the Bureau of Indian Affairs ap-
pointed police officers and judges to serve on reservations.149 Despite
this, many tribes continued to employ their traditional methods of dis-
pute resolution outside these formal courts,150 at least in part be-
cause, as some have argued, “the use of the Western adversarial
process itself tends to breakdown relationships and community, thus
compromising both persisting traditional ways and tribal
sovereignty.”151
But tribes’ reliance on perceived “inadequate” remedies created a
backlash from the federal government.152 The federal prosecution and
conviction of Crow Dog for murder resulted in a death sentence de-
spite the tribe resolving the dispute in a manner that maintained har-
mony through restitution.153 In 1883, the Supreme Court overturned
his conviction, holding that an Indian who killed another Indian in
Indian country was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe
and could not be prosecuted by the federal government.154 In re-
they represented” was essential, and hence, “the institution of a legal system—
not just martial law—was necessary”).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012); COHEN, supra note 115, § 1.03[4][b], at 51–53. This act
originated as part of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts. Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 49, 51
(2017).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. In addition to expressly extending federal laws and jurisdiction
to Indian country, the Indian Country Crimes Act also incorporated the Assimila-
tive Crimes Act, which incorporated state law into the federal code “when no fed-
eral crime has been defined.” COHEN, supra note 115, § 9.02[1][c][ii], at 740.
149. Getches, supra note 99, at 7–8; Summary Report, supra note 89, at 14.
150. Getches, supra note 99, at 8–9.
151. Pat Sekaquaptewa, Key Concepts in the Finding, Definition and Consideration of
Custom Law in Tribal Lawmaking, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 375 (2007) (citing
Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How
the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235 (1997)).
152. Getches, supra note 99, at 9.
153. See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
154. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 556, 557–58, 570, 572 (1883) (holding that a
tribal member was not subject to federal prosecution for murder because Con-
gress had not enacted the statute punishing “crimes arising within the . . . terri-
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sponse, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act,155 which granted the
federal government jurisdiction to prosecute certain crimes occurring
in Indian country, including when both the defendant and the victim
were Indian.156 Although states cannot generally criminalize conduct
occurring on reservations,157 Congress passed Public Law 280,158
which delegated jurisdiction over “most crimes and many civil mat-
ters” in Indian country to several states, including California.159
Tribes retained inherent, concurrent jurisdiction over Indians.160
As part of this overall transition, and in connection with passage of
the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934,161 many tribes developed for-
mal “tribal justice systems,”162 including tribal courts, which “are rel-
atively new phenomena in Indian country.”163 Most tribal courts were
torial jurisdiction of the United States” “expressly with reference to them as
members of an Indian tribe”).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). As with passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, Congress
sought some standardization in terms of treatment for Indians. See COHEN, supra
note 115, § 9.02[2][a], at 749–50.
156. This Act was held to be within the federal government’s authority to legislate in
Indian country:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to
their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell. It must exist in that Government, because it never has existed
anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise is within the geograph-
ical limits of the United States; because it has never been denied; and
because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886); see also United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 649–50 (1977) (concluding that the Major Crimes Act did
not violate the Indian defendants’ due process rights).
157. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (“The Indian nations had always
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights . . . . The very term ‘nation,’ so generally applied to them,
means ‘a people distinct from others.’”); see also COHEN, supra note 115, § 9.03[1],
at 763–64 (explaining the scope of authority that states have regarding criminal
conduct that occurs on a reservation).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012).
159. COHEN, supra note 115, § 6.04[3], at 537. Those states initially were California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin; Alaska was added later. Id. Other
states had the “option of accepting the same jurisdiction,” and some did. Id. En-
actment of Public Law 280 led to “fear among Indian people [concerning] the
transfer of law and order to the States. It has been interpreted quite generally as
meaning termination.” Summary Report, supra note 89, at 9; see also WILKINS &
WILKINS, supra note 2, at 103 (discussing the complexities of Public Law 280).
160. COHEN, supra note 115, § 6.04[3][c], at 555.
161. Tribal Courts, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=29
[https://perma.unl.edu/PBD3-JV6Y].
162. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 67; see also, e.g., MILLE LACS BAND OF OJIBWE STAT.
ANN. tit. 24 §§ 1–4305 (2012), http://millelacsbandlegislativebranch.com/wp-con
tent/uploads/2015/01/Title-24-Judicial-Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/LV
5J-JMNC] (establishing a tribal judicial system).
163. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 67.
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modeled after American courts, but many had no appeal system.164 In
terms of criminal cases, by the 1970s, the vast majority of tribes did
not have a formal criminal justice system.165 About half of all tribes
now have some form of a tribal justice system.166
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 further curtailed tribal author-
ity by not only requiring tribes to provide many federal constitutional
guarantees but also by expressly limiting tribal courts’ sentences in
criminal matters to imprisonment not exceeding six months and a fine
of $500.167 In 1986, the Indian Civil Rights Act was amended to per-
mit imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of up to $5,000.168 As
part of the Tribal Law and Order Act, the statute was amended again
in 2010 to permit imprisonment for up to three years per offense (up to
nine years total if three or more offenses) and a fine of up to
$15,000,169 provided the tribal prosecution meets certain federal stan-
dards, including free effective assistance of counsel and law-trained
judges.170 Despite these expansions, tribal remedies remain substan-
tively limited.
2. The Trend to Disenroll for Conduct
In response to increasing crime, especially drug offenses,171 and
insufficient tools to address criminal conduct on reservations,172 many
tribes are turning to disenrollment. Tribal citizens who are convicted
of or engage in criminal activity are being removed (or threatened
with removal) from tribal rolls.173 Disenrollment and banishment—
164. Summary Report, supra note 89, at 16.
165. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 384 (noting that “only a few dozen Indian nations
were in the business of prosecuting crimes” by the 1970s).
166. Tribal Justice Systems: A Brief History of Tribal Courts, NAT’L TRIBAL JUST. RE-
SOURCE CTR., http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/pages/justice.htm [https://per
ma.unl.edu/ML2P-VQKX]. Many tribes have no tribal courts. COHEN, supra note
115, § 4.04[3][c][iv][A], at 263–64.
167. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968); Getches, supra
note 99, at 12.
168. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (1986) (codi-
fied at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (2012)).
169. Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat.
2279 (2010) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(C)).
170. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b). Since 2013, tribes have also been able to prosecute non-Indi-
ans for some domestic violence offenses, provided that the tribe provides certain
constitutional protections. 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
171. Riley, supra note 4, at 1105.
172. Id. at 1104 (noting that federal law significantly limits “tribes’ ability to police
reservations,” the sentences they can impose are limited, and “[a]lthough the fed-
eral government has jurisdiction to try major crimes, such crimes regularly es-
cape the attention of federal prosecutors, who are often located hundreds of miles
from the reservation”); see also infra notes 274–288 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing crime in Native American territory).
173. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 144.
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when a tribal citizen is prohibited from being on tribal lands for a pe-
riod of time—are distinct concepts; it is possible to have one without
the other or to have both at the same time, but the effects differ.174
Disenrollment occurs when an enrolled tribal member is removed
from the tribal rolls and results in the “loss of tribal citizenship.”175 In
contrast to the historic practice of temporary banishment, disenroll-
ment originated in the 1930s in connection with the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act.176 Over the past forty years, however, disenrollment has
become an “epidemic.”177 Even temporary banishment is often seen as
“a far worse punishment than death because it cuts off a person’s abil-
ity to be part of the community,”178 yet disenrollment—the permanent
loss of community and identity—is occurring more frequently because
of criminal conduct.179
Many tribal code provisions are not readily accessible through on-
line databases or generally available print sources.180 Hence, compre-
174. Quair II, No. 1:02-CV-5891 DFL, 2007 WL 1490571, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 21,
2007). Courts and commentators, however, often conflate the two. See, e.g., Ta-
vares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2017); WILKINS & WILKINS,
supra note 2, at 4. Terminology reflecting disenfranchisement more broadly is
often imprecise, as noted by some scholars. See, e.g., Leo Zaibert, Uprootedness as
(Cruel and Unusual) Punishment, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 384, 385 (2008) (arguing
that “expatriation, denationalization, denaturalization, removal, exclusion, ex-
pulsion, banishment, relocation, transportation, extradition, [and] deportation”
reflect “interesting differences between genuinely different phenomena, but there
are similarities between most of these terms that tend to be overlooked”).
175. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 4, 5.
176. Id. at 4.
177. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text; WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2,
at 67.
178. Felicia Fonseca & Russell Contreras, Most American Indian Tribes Opt Out of
Federal Death Penalty, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 21, 2017) https://www.apnews
.com/86b9734f456846e9b0df9faa0237122f [https://perma.unl.edu/8LEP-B54B].
179. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 144. At least one court acknowledged that
“the coerced and peremptory deprivation of petitioners’ membership in the tribe
and their social and cultural affiliation” is “a more severe punishment than im-
prisonment.” Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 895 (2d
Cir. 1996).
180. COHEN, supra note 115, § 4.05[1], at 270; WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 67
n.1. A few organizations make various tribal codes available, but they are not yet
exhaustive. For example, the National Indian Law Library, a division of the Na-
tive American Rights Fund, “is a law library devoted to federal Indian and tribal
law” that “maintains a unique and valuable collection of Indian law resources.”
National Indian Law Library, NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND, https://www.narf.org/nill/
index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/7ABV-PQG9]. In addition, the Ross-Bakley
Law Library at Arizona State University includes many tribal materials, Indian
Law: Home, ARIZ. ST. U., http://libguides.law.asu.edu/indianlaw/home [https://per
ma.unl.edu/9KDC-XTHW] (last updated July 12, 2018), as does the Library of
Congress, Indigenous Law Portal, Indigenous Law Portal: United States, LIBR.
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/indigenous-law-guide/americas/north-
america/united-states/index.php [https://perma.unl.edu/K59T-3PBY] (last up-
dated Mar. 13, 2018). The Tribal Law and Order Act requires tribes seeking
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hensive research to determine the extent of the problem is difficult.
Yet at least seven tribes have enacted code provisions that expressly
permit disenrollment for criminal conduct. For example, the
Meskwaki Nation, Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa permits
disenrollment when a tribal member is convicted of murder; rape; in-
cest; more than one conviction for drug trafficking, manufacturing, or
distribution; or treason.181 The Lummi Nation permits disenrollment
of tribal members “convicted under tribal, state or federal law of a
crime which threatens the well-being, economic or social welfare, or
culture of the Lummi Nation and its members.”182 The Wyandotte Na-
tion’s code provides that any “member/citizen, who is found guilty of a
shocking or heinous crime against society or the Wyandotte Nation,
shall also be subject to dis-enrollment.”183 And the Mashantucket Pe-
quot Tribe allows their Elders Council to “hear and determine any
matter concerning the banishment or exclusion of any person from the
Mashantucket (Western) Pequot Reservation and tribal lands as nec-
essary to preserve and protect the safety and well-being of the Tribe
and the Tribal Community,” including the “removal of any Tribal ben-
efits and membership privileges.”184
At least three tribes have code provisions that, via a two-step pro-
cess, permit disenrollment for criminal conduct. In those instances,
criminal conduct constitutes grounds for banishment, and banishment
constitutes grounds for disenrollment. The Pueblo of Laguna, for ex-
ample, permits banishment for murder, aggravated sexual abuse, sex-
ual abuse, sexual abuse of a minor or ward, sexual exploitation of
children, and selling or buying of children.185 That same general code
section then expressly provides that “banishment from the Reservation
greater criminal jurisdiction to make their codes publicly available. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(c)(4) (2012).
181. SAC & FOX TRIBAL CODE, tit. 10, art. 6, § 10-6101 (2017), https://drive.google.com/
file/d/0B0BtqpQ32vW6SnI1WmRYLXpzb0U/view [https://perma.unl.edu/QT94-
CSZ7].
182. LUMMI NATION CODE OF LAWS § 34.07.010(d) (1999), https://www.narf.org/nill/
codes/lummi/34Enrollment.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/3BX9-TWL4]. The Lummi
Nation also permits exclusion, but not disenrollment, for certain conduct
“whether or not criminally charged.” § 12.02.020 (emphasis added).
183. WYANDOTTE NATION TRIBAL ENROLLMENT ORDINANCE, § 8(B), http://www.wyan
dotte-nation.org/government/legal-documents/enrollment-ordinance/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/YV3C-R5HS].
184. MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBE CONST. art. XII, § 1(d), http://www.mpt
nlaw.com/laws/MPT%20CONSTITUTION%20%20BYLAWS%209%2019%2012
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/G6M8-RLZR]. The targeted conduct includes illegal
drugs, sexual offenses, domestic violence, and violent conduct; see also Kunesh,
supra note 111, at 110 (discussing the rights incorporated by the Indian Civil
Rights Act).
185. PUEBLO OF LAGUNA, N.M. TRIBAL CODE, § 15-3-6(A), https://library.municode.com/
nm/pueblo_of_laguna/codes/tribal_code?nodeId=TITXVCRCO_CH3SE_S15-3-6
BA [https://perma.unl.edu/RYL2-LPZW] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
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may constitute the loss of membership and associated rights in the
Pueblo.”186 Similarly, the Snoqualmie Tribe, providing in its constitu-
tion that “membership is a privilege that may be revoked,”187 permits
the General Council to “impose a penalty of full or partial banishment
against any enrolled tribal member for good cause in accord with Sno-
qualmie Tribal tradition or the acts and resolutions of the tribe.”188
The Snoqualmie Tribe Code then provides that any enrolled member
who is banished “may be disenrolled.”189 And the Tribal Council of the
Organized Village of Kake “shall have the right to remove persons
from the tribal roll and revoke the privileges of citizenship”190 under
certain conditions, including when “a member is permanently ban-
ished by the Keex’ Kwaan Tribal Court from the community of Kake
because of danger to the safety of village residents.”191
Other tribes practice disenrollment for certain types of criminal
conduct, although their code provisions are not generally accessible.
For example, the Elem Indian Colony Pomo Tribe disenrolled two
members based on a tribal ordinance that permitted the Council to
“cull[ ] from the active membership voting list tribal members who are
alleged to have conducted crimes against the Tribe.”192 Some tribes
have also recently threatened to disenroll tribal members over crimi-
nal activity. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of Idaho, for example, re-
cently threatened to disenroll a tribal member accused of murder and
seven other tribal members, many of whom were related.193
In addition, a number of tribes are considering or have considered
disenrollment for criminal activity,194 often drug convictions.195 Dis-
186. § 15-3-6(C) (emphasis added).
187. SNOQUALMIE TRIBE OF INDIANS CONST. art. II, § 3, http://www.snoqualmietribe.us/
sites/default/files/linkedfiles/constitution.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/3626-6FLL].
188. Id.
189. SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CODE § 18.0(b) (2008) (emphasis added), http://www.snoqual
mietribe.us/sites/default/files/enrollment_act.2.3.codified.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/XT9H-PBKA].
190. KEEX’ KWAAN TRIBE, ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE CITIZENSHIP & ENROLLMENT
CODE § 8 (emphasis added), http://www.kakefirstnation.org/uploads/5/4/3/1/5431
6983/citizenship_and_enrollment_code.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/J233-395U].
191. § 8(3).
192. Brown v. Garcia, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910, 912 (Ct. App. 2017).
193. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Threaten Disenrollment in Murder Case, INDIANZ.COM
(Jun. 3, 2016), https://www.indianz.com/News/2016/06/03/shoshonebannock-
tribes-threaten-disenrol.asp.
194. See, e.g., Sarah Reith, Pomo Protest: Elem Indian Colony Members Discuss Disen-
franchisement and Disenrollment, UKIAH DAILY J. (Apr. 15, 2016) http://www
.ukiahdailyjournal.com/article/NP/20160415/NEWS/160419913 [https://perma
.unl.edu/NU6T-CGVU] (explaining that tribal members were facing disenroll-
ment from the tribe after receiving notices that they “committed all these crimes,
of rape and assault . . . it was just a blanket accusation,” as Elem Indian Colony
has no tribal court).
195. See, e.g., Press Release, Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indi-
ans Declares State of Emergency (Apr. 13, 2013), https://turtletalk.files.word
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enrollment and permanent banishment for a second drug trafficking
conviction, for example, was considered but rejected by members of
the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe of Nevada.196 Four members of the
Allakaket in Alaska were banished because they were suspected of
dealing methamphetamines, and the tribal chief stated that “[w]e can
banish people. The tribal board can vote to disenroll a tribal member.
We are willing to go that route.”197 At least one tribal councilmember
believes that sexual predators should be disenrolled.198 Furthermore,
the phenomenon is likely to spread, as a significant number of tribal
constitutions grant authority to the tribal council to enact code provi-
sions governing disenrollment or loss of membership.199
press.com/2013/04/2013-04-03-ldf-press-release-ldfstate-of-emergency-re-synthet
ic-and-illegal-drugs-final.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/Y822-8ME7] (noting that the
tribe was considering “Banishment, Disenrollment and/or Forfeiture of Per Cap-
ita payments for those caught using, selling and/or manufacturing synthetic can-
nabinoids and synthetic cathinones”); Scott McKie B.P., Council Discusses Drug
Problem, Possible Banishments, CHEROKEE ONE FEATHER (Dec. 10, 2015), https://
theonefeather.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/December-10.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/P983-3XXX] (noting that one tribal representative is opposed to “dis-
enrollment for drug offenders”).
196. No Banishment for Fallon-Paiute Shoshone Tribe, INDIANZ.COM (Dec. 19, 2006),
https://indianz.com/News/2006/017439.asp.
197. Kevin Baird, Allakaket Banishes 4 People over Meth, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-
MINER (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.newsminer.com/news/local_news/tribe-banish
es-people-over-meth/article_1f4d0e3a-fa72-11e6-87df-2f4855259331.html [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/9R6C-8UUM]. Furthermore, at least one tribe prohibits tribal le-
gal aid representation for members accused of various drug crimes. MILLE LACS
BAND OF OJIBWE INDIANS, Joint Resolution 17-01-84-16 (May 26, 2016), http://
millelacsbandlegislativebranch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/17-01-84-16-
Mandating-MLB-Legal-Aid-Office-cease-representation-on-1st-2nd-degree-drug-
offenses.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/QAM2-D5JR].
198. Garfield Steele, Oglala Sioux Tribe Must Protect Our Children, INDIANZ.COM
(Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.indianz.com/News/2014/11/17/garfield-steele-oglala-
sioux-t.asp (arguing that members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe of South Dakota on
the Pine Ridge Reservation who are child sexual predators should be disenrolled
and banished).
199. See, e.g., KAW NATION CONST. art. IV, § 3(C)(3), http://kawnation.com/?page_id=
3312#ARTICLE%20V:%20TRIBAL%20COUNCIL [https://perma.unl.edu/JNA6-
QZ6X]; NATIVE VILLAGE OF CHANEGA CONST. art. II, § 3, http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/
chancons.html [https://perma.unl.edu/A7UZ-CN3R]; NORTHWAY TRIBE CONST.
art. III, § 5, http://www.aptalaska.net/~nicholr/Constitution%20of%20NVC.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/HSJ2-VMQY]. At least 150 tribal constitutions discuss
“loss of membership.” Wilkins, supra note 136, at 247. Many of these provisions
are identical or very similar, suggesting the language was included in Bureau of
Indian Affairs drafts. See COHEN, supra note 115, § 404[3][a][i], at 257; see also,
e.g., SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. CONST. art. II, § 5, http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/flsem
cons.html [https://perma.unl.edu/74NV-VX57] (granting the Seminole Tribal
Council “the power to pass ordinances . . . governing the future membership, loss
of membership and the adoption of members . . . .”) (emphasis added); TONKAWA
TRIBE OF OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 2, http://www.tonkawatribe.com/Constitution%
20of%20the%20Tonkawa%20Tribe%20of%20Indians%20of%20Oklahoma.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/4B2D-52QX] (granting the Council the “power to prescribe
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Despite significant movement toward disenrolling tribal members
for criminal conduct, it appears that only two federal courts200 have
considered challenges to disenrollment on this basis; in each case, the
underlying issue was political disagreement between various tribal
factions rather than actual “criminal” conduct. In the first case, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered a challenge by tribal mem-
bers who were disenrolled and permanently banished from the reser-
vation.201 The banishment orders indicated that their names were
“removed from the Tribal rolls” and they were stripped of their “In-
dian citizenship and [would] permanently lose any and all rights af-
forded [to] members.”202 The court acknowledged that the issue was
whether it had the authority to “examine the scope of and limitations
on the [tribe’s] power to strip the petitioners of their tribal member-
ship”203 and determined that habeas review was appropriate,204 yet
the court generally framed the issue in terms of banishment.205 Even
the petitioners asserted that the banishment (rather than disenroll-
ment) violated the Indian Civil Rights Act’s “cruel and unusual pun-
ishments” prohibition.206
rules and regulations . . . covering future membership including adoptions and
the loss of membership”) (emphasis added); WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE OF
THE FORT APACHE INDIAN RESERVATION CONST. art. II, § 2, http://www.wmat.nsn
.us/Legal/Constitution.html [https://perma.unl.edu/L9EQ-7CJU] (granting the
Council “the power to pass ordinances . . . governing future membership, loss of
membership, and all other necessary procedures of enrollment”) (emphasis ad-
ded). In addition, some tribal constitutions imply that disenrollment is possible,
although the reasons permitting disenrollment are not explicit. See, e.g., SALT
RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN COMM. CONST. art. II, § 5, https://www.srpmic-nsn
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CodeOfOrdinances-Constitution.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/55ZK-38GK] (providing that the “Community Council shall . . . pro-
vide for a fair hearing to any claimant to membership aggrieved by the omission
or deletion of his or her name” to the tribal membership roll (emphasis added)). A
handful of tribes, though, including the Federated Indians of Graton Rancheria
and the Spokane Tribe, have amended their constitutions to expressly ban dis-
enrollment. See, e.g., Jarvis, supra note 1.
200. Challenges may, of course, proceed in tribal court. Those opinions are, however,
often difficult to access. COHEN, supra note 115, § 4.05[1], at 270; Galanda &
Dreveskratch, supra note 136, at 387.
201. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 876–77 (2d Cir.
1996).
202. Id. at 878.
203. Id. at 897. The court concluded that the tribal officials “imposed punitive sanc-
tions” for “allegedly criminal conduct.” Id. at 901.
204. Id. at 901. This conclusion has been criticized by some scholars. See, e.g., Angela
R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 801, 814–15
(2007).
205. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 893–98. The court’s reliance on banishment may stem from the
parties’ arguments.
206. See generally Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 20, 29, 40, Poodry, 85 F.3d 874
(No. 492), 1995 WL 17214518.
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In the second case, the Eastern District of California concluded
that “disenrollment from tribal membership and subsequent banish-
ment from the reservation” was a detention207 but held that the tribal
members—again, focusing on the banishment, not disenrollment—
had no claim under the Indian Civil Rights Act’s cruel and unusual
punishments clause because they were not imprisoned for more than a
year or fined more than $5,000.208 Three years later, the court explic-
itly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to consider the claim that the peti-
tioners’ disenrollment violated the Indian Civil Rights Act.209
V. TRIBAL DISENROLLMENT IS EQUIVALENT TO
REVOCATION OF CITIZENSHIP
All governments have the authority to decide—at the outset—who
can become a citizen of their nation.210 As sovereign nations, tribes
have complete authority to decide who is eligible for enrollment.211
But there is a distinction between eligibility for membership in the
first instance (over which tribes have plenary authority) and the
forced revocation of membership for criminal conduct after tribal
membership has been granted.212
207. Quair I, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 971 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2004).
208. Id. at 978–79. The court concluded, however, that it had jurisdiction to consider
whether the disenrollment and banishment violated due process or fair trial re-
quirements. Id. at 977–78.
209. Quair II, No. 1:02-CV-5891 DFL, 2007 WL 1490571, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. May 31,
2007) (granting the tribe’s motion for summary judgment on this claim because
the disenrolled tribal members “failed to show that disenrollment affects their
physical freedom to a degree that it may be considered tantamount to detention,”
as required for habeas relief).
210. See, e.g., Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). Despite significant lim-
its on American citizenship for centuries, today “[a]ll persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although not initially applicable to
Native Americans, the 1924 Citizenship Act granted citizenship to Indians born
in the United States who were not already citizens by treaty or through other
means. Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924). Interestingly, a “long politico-
legal tradition labeled Native Americans aliens despite the fact that Americans
claimed sovereignty over them.” KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMI-
GRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AMERICA, 1600–2000, at 222 (2015). Professor
Parker also made note of the exclusion of large groups of people based on “relig-
ion, race, national origin, health, sexuality, poverty, political ideology, and crimi-
nal or terrorist background, to name only a few . . . .” Id. at 3. In addition to
historical exclusions, the Expatriation Act of 1907 articulated grounds for revok-
ing citizenship, including when a woman married a non-citizen. Pub. L. No. 193,
34 Stat. 1228 (1907). The Act was limited in 1922 by the Cable Act and finally
repealed in 1940. PARKER, supra note 210, at 176–78.
211. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978).
212. See, e.g., Galanda & Dreveskratch, supra note 136, at 389, 444 (arguing that “dis-
enrollment . . . is not an exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty”).
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Citizens are individuals joined in a society that shares a national
identity.213 Nationality includes three components: first, the members
may see their nationality as a key part of their personal identity; sec-
ond, the members have greater duties to others in the nation than to
aliens/outsiders; and third, the members can claim a right to self-de-
termination.214 As with the United States, tribal nations are just
that—nations. Even under their qualified status vis-a`-vis the federal
government, where tribes have been described as “domestic dependent
nations,”215 they are still nations.216 As such, tribal membership is a
political classification, not a racial one.217 And as recognized by the
Supreme Court, the “Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities retaining their original
natural rights . . . . The very term ‘nation,’ so generally applied to
them, means ‘a people distinct from others.’”218
Citizenship is a fundamental right219 and has been described as
“man’s basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have
rights.”220 In his influential formulation of the social contract, John
213. DAVID MILLER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 27 (2000). Miller asserts that
national identity has five characteristics: (1) “national communities are consti-
tuted by belief: a nationality exists when its members believe that it does”; (2) it
“embodies historical continuity”; (3) it is an “active identity,” meaning the com-
munity is engaged and its members are participants in that community; (4) it
connects its members to “a particular geographical place”; and (5) those sharing
the national identity must believe that they “share certain traits that mark them
off from other peoples.” Id. at 28–30. For most people, their citizenship “forms a
core part of their identity.” Id. at 84. Citizenship “defines political identity” and
citizenship laws “literally constitute—they create with legal words—a collective
civic identity. They proclaim the existence of a political ‘people’ and designate
who those persons are as a people, in ways that often become integral to individu-
als’ senses of personal identity as well.” ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CON-
FLICTING VIEWS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 30–31 (1999).
214. MILLER, supra note 213, at 27.
215. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014); Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
216. See, e.g., WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 4. Native people most commonly
identify themselves as members or citizens, id. at 57, and scholars in this field
often use the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 219.
217. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (justifying approval of Indian
preference in BIA hiring by explaining that the preference “is not directed to-
wards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members
of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are
racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference is political,
rather than racial in nature.”); see also, e.g., Terrill Pollman, Double Jeopardy
and Nonmember Indians in Indian Country, 82 NEB. L. REV. 889, 895 (2004) (not-
ing that because the federal government negotiated treaties with tribes as op-
posed to individuals, “tribal membership generally determined individual
members’ rights”).
218. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
219. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958).
220. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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Locke posited that “individuals and society joined together voluntarily
to form social compacts and communities.”221 Citizenship is thus a
matter of consent;222 citizens voluntarily elect to become part of the
community.223 Individuals within this community surrender some of
their power to the government, which in turn protects the citizens’
“lives, liberties and property.”224 In this way, citizens become a “body
politic.”225 Because of this voluntary relationship, the government
cannot abridge the fundamental powers inherent in the individual;
they pre-existed the established government.226 This holds true in in-
digenous nations as well, which reflect overlapping traditions: “the
people—the tribal community members themselves—are the
sovereign.”227
Furthermore, just as U.S. citizenship provides significant tangible
and intangible benefits and “surrounds the individual” with “great im-
munities,”228 tribal citizenship provides a variety of protections and
benefits, including access to tribal and federal governmental ser-
vices.229 Healthcare, housing, employment preferences, and education
benefits, just to name a few, all flow from tribal citizenship.230 In ad-
dition, because of recent gaming wealth, tribal citizenship can have
significant financial benefits including substantial per capita
payments.231
221. Josh Blackman, Original Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 95, 104
(2010).
222. Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 681, 708 (1997). In this vein, some Canadian tribes recognize that banish-
ment for a period of time may be appropriate; as noted, when “a person’s beha-
viour is destructive or disruptive, the band member is no longer consenting to
being part of the greater community and its accepted values and must leave until
he is ready to respect them.” Katherine Harding & Dawn Walton, Natives Try
‘Banishment’ to Fight Crime, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 8, 2006), https://www.theglobe
andmail.com/news/national/natives-try-banishment-to-fight-crime/article10944
79/ [https://perma.unl.edu/2NYC-N5G6].
223. Blackman, supra note 221, at 111, 116.
224. Douglas G. Smith, A Lockean Analysis of Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1095, 1150 (2002).
225. Smith, supra note 222, at 694, 706 (citations omitted). Although some tribal na-
tions may not subscribe to the social compact theory, it is clear that tribal mem-
bers are “citizens” and not “subjects” (contrasted from the early British settlers in
the Americas).
226. Id. at 695–96.
227. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 6.
228. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 76 (1921).
229. COHEN, supra note 115, § 3.03[1], at 171 (identifying a number of benefits includ-
ing exemption from state taxation and state criminal jurisdiction and rights to
trust lands).
230. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 219; see also Jeffredo v. Macarro, 590 F.3d 751,
756–57 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the benefits appellants were denied); Jarvis,
supra note 1 (discussing the benefits associated with tribal citizenship).
231. FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 219 (“Tribal membership has acquired an economic
value, sometimes making tribal members incredibly wealthy.”); see also Hilleary,
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The intangible benefits of citizenship are perhaps less obvious, but
even more significant.232 Participating in “a collective—perhaps one of
the deepest of all human needs”—is a basic characteristic of citizen-
ship.233 Tribes are not merely “clubs”;234 tribal citizenship provides an
individual with a culture, an identity, and a community.235 As noted
by one court when discussing tribal citizenship,
It is the essence of one’s identity, belonging to community, connection to one’s
heritage and an affirmation of their human being place in this life and world.
In short, it is not an overstatement to say that it is everything. In fact, it
would be an understatement to say anything less.236
Citizenship also creates aliens237—those not entitled to the bene-
fits of citizenship.238 Although all persons are entitled to some “abso-
lute” rights, only citizens can benefit from the “relative” rights that
exist by virtue of their social compact.239 Most significantly, in addi-
tion to other disabilities placed upon aliens by virtue of their non-citi-
zen status, they are “subject to the ubiquitous experience of borders:
they might be formally excluded and removed in ways that citizens no
longer experience.”240 Professor Riley powerfully articulated that dis-
supra note 1 (explaining that the Pechanga tribe was distributing approximately
$300,000 per year to each tribal member).
232. See, e.g., WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 4 (“[T]he right to belong and to rest
assured of one’s integral place in a particular Indigenous community is critical.”);
Jae, supra note 1 (describing the most significant component of tribal citizenship
as the “connection that we all have as native people to our community, to our
traditions and to each other”).
233. Marquez, supra note 4, at 184.
234. See, e.g., Galanda & Dreveskratch, supra note 136, at 451; Jarvis, supra note 1.
235. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 4, at 1074, 1114–15; Hilleary, supra note 1 (quoting a
disenrolled tribal member as saying the tribe has “desecrated the memory of our
ancestors” and “ripped our history from us”); Jarvis, supra note 1; Associated
Press, Disenrollment Leaves Natives “Culturally Homeless,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 20,
2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/disenrollment-leaves-natives-culturally-
homeless/ [https://perma.unl.edu/RJ6S-DPDQ].
236. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 133 (quoting Samuelson v. Little River Band
of Ottawa Indians, No. 06-113-AP, 2007 WL 6900788, at *2 (Little River Ct. App.
June 24, 2007)). Of course, the relationship between identity, nationality, and
citizenship is very complicated; scholars debate these topics, yet the importance
of citizenship is difficult to overstate.
237. PARKER, supra note 210, at 10–12 (describing “an intensifying substantive dis-
tinction between citizen and alien” and pointing out that although citizenship is
usually “represented as a positive good, bringing with it a sense of communal
membership, the ability to participate in the affairs of the community, and so on,”
citizenship has a negative aspect in that it makes individuals “less foreign,” “less
like the aliens with whom they once shared much”).
238. MILLER, supra note 213, at 27 (“The duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are
different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to human beings as
such”); Smith, supra note 224, at 1154.
239. Smith, supra note 222, at 731–32.
240. PARKER, supra note 210, at 10; see also Monestersky v. Hopi Tribe, No.
01AP000015 (Hopi Tribal App. Ct. June 27, 2002), as reprinted in FLETCHER,
supra note 18, at 355 (“It is well settled that the Hopi Tribe, and all Indian tribal
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enrolled tribal citizens suffer a “particularly poignant loss” because
they “are unlikely to be able to access a community outside the tribe
where they will be able to speak their language, participate in relig-
ious ceremonies, commune with sacred sites, or engage with other In-
dians of the same (or similar) tribal affiliation.”241 Once disenrolled,
many tribal members who initially might have been eligible for enroll-
ment in another tribe may now be precluded from enrolling else-
where.242 And there are compounding generational impacts; when a
parent’s tribal membership is revoked, his or her children (and their
children and their children) are also likely to lose their membership or
eligibility for membership.243
Although disenrolled tribal citizens are technically not left “state-
less”—for they retain their U.S. citizenship—they lose tribal citizen-
ship244 and their key identity.245 Furthermore, because tribes retain
the inherent authority to exclude non-members,246 the former tribal
member may remain on tribal lands only with the permission of tribal
governments, have the inherent power to exclude nonmembers as an exercise of
their sovereign power in order to protect the health and safety of tribal mem-
bers.”); Wilkins, supra note 136, at 236–37.
241. Riley, supra note 4, at 1074; see also Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indi-
ans, 85 F.3d 874, 897 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “there is something distinct and
important about Indian nationhood and culture” and that “deprivation of citizen-
ship does more than merely restrict one’s freedom to go or remain where others
have the right to be: it often works a destruction of one’s social, cultural, and
political existence”); James Dao, In California, Indian Tribes with Casino Money
Case Off Members, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/
13/us/california-indian-tribes-eject-thousands-of-members.html (arguing that
disenrollment is “psychologically devastating” and destroys connections to ances-
tors, cultural heritage, and tradition).
242. For example, the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, which permits
enrollment by an individual who was enrolled in another tribe prior to age eigh-
teen but meets their eligibility requirements, requires that the individual apply
for enrollment within one hundred eighty days after turning eighteen; this option
appears unavailable to a person disenrolled from a different tribe after that point.
SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN COMM. CONST. art. II, § 2, https://www
.srpmic-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CodeOfOrdinances-Constitution.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/55ZK-38GK].
243. See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Stateless in the United States: Current Reality and a Fu-
ture Prediction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443, 500, 506 (2013); Wilkins, supra
note 136, at 244–45.
244. Riley, supra note 4, at 1114–15 (noting that “[t]ribal members who are exiled
from their tribe will still have American citizenship, but unless they can satisfy
eligibility for enrollment in another tribe or are adopted by another Indian na-
tion, they will be permanently devoid of tribal citizenship”).
245. Jeffredo v. Macarro, 590 F.3d 751, 765 (9th Cir. 2009) (Wilken, J., dissenting)
(noting that although those disenrolled from their tribe “retain their United
States citizenship and will not be physically stateless, they have been stripped of
their lifelong citizenship and identity as Pechangans. This is more than just the
loss of a label, it is a loss of a political, ethnic, racial, and social association”).
246. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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officials. Trop himself was not excluded from the United States follow-
ing his conviction for wartime desertion.247 He was sentenced to three
years at hard labor and dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Army
in 1944, but he remained in the United States with no indication he
was not a citizen until he applied for a passport in 1952.248 Even
though he remained in the United States and even though another
country might admit him,249 the Supreme Court determined that
stripping him of his citizenship as punishment for a crime was “more
primitive than torture.”250
Despite this, many courts and scholars rely on the Supreme
Court’s 1978 decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez251 and assert
that tribes have plenary power over all decisions affecting member-
ship and hence, non-tribal courts have no jurisdiction to address dis-
enrollment disputes.252 At issue in Santa Clara, however, was the
tribe’s authority to enact a membership ordinance that discriminated
on the basis of gender: a decision by the tribe—on the front end—to
decide membership requirements.253 The Court held that the federal
courts had no jurisdiction because Congress, when passing the Indian
Civil Rights Act, did not expressly waive tribes’ sovereign immunity
for civil membership disputes.254 Congress did, however, provide for
federal court habeas review in criminal cases and the Indian Civil
Rights Act expressly forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.”255 Be-
cause the issue addressed in Santa Clara was qualifications for be-
coming a member, not disenrollment and not punishment, it does not
247. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 88 (1958).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 101.
250. Id.
251. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
252. See, e.g., Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 876 (9th Cir. 2017); Jeffredo v.
Macarro, 590 F.3d 751, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2009). But see Galanda & Dreveskratch,
supra note 136, at 407. In addition, some scholars equate the right against forced
removal as a right of entry (and see the right of exit as prohibiting voluntary
departure). Riley, supra note 4, at 1072, 1074 (suggesting that due process should
solve these issues). Rights of entry are admittedly broader than restrictions on
exit, but there is a difference between admitting someone in the first instance
and forcibly removing the person later.
253. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51–52 (1978).
254. Id. at 72.
255. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7)(A), 1303 (2012); see also Reply Brief for Petitioners-Ap-
pellants, at 4, Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (1996)
(No. 492), 1995 WL 17200250, at *4 (pointing out that Santa Clara and other
authorities cited by the tribe do not “involve application of the criminal authority
of a tribe to punish individuals, who, without question, meet general tribal mem-
bership requirements. The petitioners in this case undisputedly are members of
the Tonawanda Seneca tribe by birth. Petitioner’s citizenship rights were not be-
stowed upon them by the Council of Chiefs in the first place”).
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preclude a determination that disenrollment for criminal conduct vio-
lates the Indian Civil Rights Act.256
Citizenship can be voluntarily relinquished257 or revoked because
of a voluntary act by a citizen intending to relinquish nationality.258
But it cannot be revoked,259 even for misbehavior.260 Once an individ-
ual is enrolled in a tribe, involuntarily extinguishing that membership
for reasons other than fraud or mistake in the enrollment process—a
reason that would negate the initial eligibility and commonly accepted
grounds for revoking citizenship—violates the basic precepts of volun-
tary citizenship and is not mandated by the Court’s holding in Santa
Clara.261
256. The Santa Clara Court did state that a “tribe’s right to define its own member-
ship for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an
independent political community.” Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32. Whether
that pronouncement is viewed as non-binding dictum or as part of the Court’s
reasoning in support of its judgment, and hence arguably as part of the case’s
holding, that language must be read in light of the ultimate issue before the
Court: a civil challenge to a tribal ordinance denying membership to one class of
people. As such, that language cannot be binding on future courts considering
whether disenrolling members as the result of criminal conduct, in claimed viola-
tion of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, violates the Indian
Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and
Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 221, 223–24 (2010).
257. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2012); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958); see also, e.g.,
Price, supra note 243, at 452–53 (citations omitted) (discussing the U.S. reserva-
tions to conventions on statelessness: namely because they “limit[ ] voluntary re-
nunciation of nationality . . . that is recognized under U.S. law”). This contrasts
with Lord Coke’s early 1600s “perpetual allegiance theory,” whereby “the alle-
giance a person acquires at birth to the sovereign is natural and immutable, and
cannot be relinquished or abandoned.” Blackman, supra note 221, at 103.
258. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a); see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding
that stripping citizenship from a naturalized citizen for voting in another coun-
try’s elections violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
259. Trop, 356 U.S. at 90; see also Alan G. James, Expatriation in the United States:
Precept and Practice Today and Yesterday, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 853, 855 (1990)
(“[T]he grant of citizenship . . . is absolute and was designed to protect every
citizen against a forcible destruction of citizenship. After 200 years there is now
in all branches of government a consensus that an American citizen, natural born
or naturalized, has a constitutional right to remain a citizen unless he/she volun-
tarily assents to relinquish citizenship.”); WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 4
(“Tribal councils and other governing institutions . . . do not have or should not
have the power to sever their relationship to their people by taking away the
most important status, the status of belonging to, of having citizenship or mem-
bership in, an Indigenous nation.”).
260. Trop, 356 U.S. at 92. Although citizenship imposes numerous obligations, failure
to meet some of those obligations cannot result in loss of citizenship. Id. at 92–93.
261. The only time the Supreme Court expressly considered whether a tribal govern-
ment could revoke citizenship the Court determined the tribe could, but that rev-
ocation cannot conflict with federal law or the federal Constitution. Roff v.
Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 223 (1897) (holding that the plaintiff, who acquired Chick-
asaw membership by marrying a non-Native who had been legislatively granted
Chickasaw membership, had a right to sue other Chickasaws in federal court
2019] TRIBAL DISENROLLMENT 855
Sovereigns also have obligations to preserve the community,262 as
tribes historically did in keeping with their overriding goal of preserv-
ing harmony.263 And “in traditional American indigenous society the
casting out of one’s own relatives did not occur.”264 The “deprivation of
citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to express
its displeasure at a citizen’s conduct, however reprehensible that con-
duct may be.”265 Even naturalized citizens, who may have the order
admitting them to citizenship revoked and their certificate of naturali-
zation cancelled for reasons such as fraud,266 cannot lose their citizen-
ship without substantial due process.267 Revoking citizenship
deprives the individual of “a right no less precious than life or lib-
erty—indeed of one which today comprehends those rights and almost
because the tribal court denied him access to their courts after the tribe revoked
membership of the plaintiff’s wife, and hence, his by marriage). The Court noted,
The citizenship which the Chickasaw legislature could confer it could
withdraw. The only restriction on the power of the Chickasaw Nation to
legislate in respect to its internal affairs is that such legislation shall not
conflict with the constitution or laws of the United States, and we know
of no provision of such constitution or laws which would be set at naught
by the action of a political community like this in withdrawing privileges
of membership in the community once conferred.
Id. at 222. The Indian Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment is a law that would expressly conflict with a tribe’s ability to disenroll a
member.
262. See, e.g., Snowden v. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan, No. 04-CA-
1017, 32 Indian L. Rep. 6047, (App. Ct. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich.
Jan. 7, 2005) as reprinted in FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 259 (urging the parties
to “place themselves in the heart of Native American jurisprudence by ‘healing,
restoring balance and harmony, accomplishing reconciliation, and making social
relations whole again’”) (citations omitted); Timothy Zick, Are the States Sover-
eign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 231, 276–79 (2005).
263. See supra notes 121–127 and accompanying text.
264. Galanda & Dreveskratch, supra note 136, at 394–95 (pointing out that much like
current citizenship laws in the United States and other nations, for tribal na-
tions, “the right of belonging or kinship has historically been permanent and
could not be lost involuntarily”).
265. Trop, 356 U.S. at 92–93.
266. 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012) (providing a number of grounds for revoking certificates of
naturalization, including concealing material evidence, fraud, refusing to testify
before congressional committees, and membership in subversive organizations
within five years of becoming naturalized); see also, e.g., United States v. Nunez-
Garcia, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1077, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (granting summary
judgment to the government and revoking citizenship based on fraud in the appli-
cation process).
267. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (holding that a statutory reference to
a “crime of violence” was “impermissibly vague” and could not support the depor-
tation of a lawful resident); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 763, 776, 783
(1988) (reversing an order to complete denaturalization proceedings when the
naturalized citizen lied about his place and date of birth unless the federal gov-
ernment demonstrates “clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly” that misrepre-
sentations in the application process influenced the naturalization decision).
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all others.”268 In modern civilized nations, it is well established that
although governments have the inherent authority to exclude
aliens,269 they have no corresponding authority to denationalize
citizens.270
VI. CONCLUSION
Although tribes have the inherent authority to resolve disputes
and address their members’ conduct with sanctions, disenrolling tribal
citizens for criminal conduct constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The core protection against such punishment is—and should
be—available to all citizens within the United States, including Na-
tive American citizens.271
In addition to the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments,
however, Congress also imposed significant restrictions on the length
of time a tribe can incarcerate a convicted criminal and the amount of
fines tribes can impose.272 These latter restrictions create a signifi-
cant problem—one that has resulted in many tribes “reluctantly”
turning to disenrollment in an effort to combat increasing criminal ac-
tivity on their reservations.273
268. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring)
(reversing a default judgment that cancelled a certificate of naturalization).
269. See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 98.
270. Id. As the Supreme Court recognized over fifty years ago:
Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is
the country, and the country is its citizenry. The very nature of our free
government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under
which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group
of citizens of their citizenship.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
271. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(A) (2012). Although not specifi-
cally addressing disenrollment, Professor Angela Riley acknowledges that from
“a U.S. perspective, banishment . . . may run afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishment.” Riley, supra note 4, at 1106.
272. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7).
273. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 20, 66–67, 144. Although many tribes ex-
pressed the need for alternatives to incarceration, they still acknowledged that it
was appropriate and necessary in some cases. United States Dep’t. of Justice and
Dep’t. of Interior, Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) Long Term Plan to Build
and Enhance Tribal Justice Systems 2 (Aug. 2011), https://www.bop.gov/inmates/
docs/tloa_long_term_plan.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7UTR-QPUT] [hereinafter
DOJ] (“Tribal Leaders feel strongly that incarceration should be a last resort, but
acknowledge that detention is appropriate for those offenders at high risk for
recidivism and violence. This chapter explores Indian country needs for data,
planning, and resources to address the critical needs for the construction, renova-
tion, operations, and programming of detention facilities in Indian country.”).
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Crime in Indian country is a significant concern.274 Crime rates on
reservations are at least twice the national average,275 and Native
Americans suffer from violent crime at twice the rate of other racial
groups.276 Thirty-four percent of Native women are rape victims.277
Drug abuse and the crime that accompanies it is rampant in Indian
country.278 And federal prosecutions for crime in Indian country (and
state prosecutions in Public Law 280 states)279 are woefully inade-
quate; although life sentences and even the death penalty are poten-
tial sentences, a variety of factors, including insufficient resources,
geographical challenges, cultural differences, and priorities have re-
sulted in the failure of non-tribal governments to address criminal
conduct on reservations.280 Even when federal and state law enforce-
ment is operating at its best, the complicated criminal law jurisdiction
involving tribes and tribal members creates problems281 that can re-
sult in a “complete jurisdictional vacuum.”282
Most tribes today can impose a maximum sentence of one year in
jail and a $5,000 fine.283 The Tribal Law and Order Act, passed by
Congress in 2010 in recognition of the uphill battle that tribes face in
combatting criminal activity,284 increased those limits to three years
in jail and a $15,000 fine285 if tribes provide relatively extensive pro-
274. WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 66, 144; Angela R. Riley, Crime and Govern-
ance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1566–69 (2016).
275. Riley, supra note 274, at 1569. As noted by the Department of Justice, President
Obama pointed out in 2010 that it is “unconscionable that crime rates in Indian
country are more than twice the national average and up to 20 times the national
average on some reservations.” DOJ, supra note 273, at 7.
276. COHEN, supra note 115, § 9.01, at 736.
277. Riley, supra note 274, at 1569.
278. Id. at 1628–29.
279. See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
280. See generally, Summary Report, supra note 89, at 7–8; Kevin K. Washburn,
American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2006); Riley,
supra note 4, at 1104.
281. COHEN, supra note 115, § 9.01, at 736.
282. Riley, supra note 4, at 6.
283. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (1986) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a)(7)(B)); Riley, supra note 274, at 1567–68; see also Tribal Law & Order
Resource Center, NAT’L CONGRESS AM. INDIANS, http://tloa.ncai.org//tribesexercis-
ingTLOA.cfm [https://perma.unl.edu/8M4W-C2G9]] (indicating that as of April
2018, only eight tribes have “implemented extended sentencing” under the Tribal
Law and Order Act: Cherokee Nation (OK), Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation (OR), Eastern Band of Cherokee Nation (NC), Fort Peck
Tribes (MT), Hopi Tribe (AZ), Muscogee (Creek) Nation (OK), Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community (AZ), and Tulalip Tribes (WA), and another twelve
tribes are “close to implementing extended sentencing”).
284. DOJ, supra note 273, at 2 (describing the goal of the Tribal Law and Order Act as
“to improve public safety and justice systems in Indian country”).
285. Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2279 (2010), (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(C)
(2012)).
858 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:820
cedural protections.286 That Act, however, did not go far enough; a
maximum of three years in custody (up to nine years total for multiple
offenses) is not enough to combat the serious crimes being committed
on reservations.287 Courts may be willing to interpret tribes’ criminal
jurisdiction over members broadly,288 but courts are limited by Con-
gress’s express statutory language.
The solution is for Congress to remove the limits it imposed on the
length of incarceration and the amount of fines tribes can impose, at
least over members, so they can effectively combat crime on their res-
ervations. Ultimately, tribal citizens convicted of a crime should have
the option: submit to their tribe’s inherent criminal jurisdiction, which
could include prison sentences exceeding three years and fines exceed-
ing $15,000 at the tribe’s discretion, or voluntarily relinquish tribal
citizenship and avoid tribal criminal penalties. This solution allows
the individual to decide the significance of his or her tribal citizen-
ship,289 consistent with human dignity, civilized treatment, and the
consensual nature of citizenship itself.290 It also maintains the core
protection against cruel and unusual punishment but removes signifi-
cant barriers to effective criminal justice in Indian country.
This solution also promotes tribal sovereignty. Sovereigns have re-
sponsibilities to their citizens,291 including an obligation to preserve
286. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012).
287. Tribes have other tools at their disposal to address crime and other anti-social
behavior, and many tribes are using them more frequently. See, e.g., Sarah Ker-
shaw & Monica Davey, Tribes Revive Ancient Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/18/us/plagued-by-drugs-tribes-revive-ancient-
penalty.html (discussing removal from tribal housing as one option).
288. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 852 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that a tribe
had criminal jurisdiction to try and punish a tribal member for off-reservation
conduct “because it has not been expressly or implicitly divested of its inherent
sovereign authority to prosecute members when necessary to protect tribal self-
government or control internal relations”).
289. Wilkins, supra note 136, at 238 (citations omitted) (“Among Romans, prolonged,
if not permanent, voluntary physical exile was one way to avoid the death pen-
alty. Voluntary expatriation is, therefore, a unique case of emigration, ‘where
what is sought is not primarily the advantages of the place to which one goes, but
essentially freedom from whatever disadvantages prevailed at home.’”).
290. I argue that this would, to use Professor Riley’s words, permit “illiberal groups” to
exist in “liberal societies”—by recognizing tribes’ inherent criminal jurisdiction
over members, and at the same time, allowing tribal citizens to voluntarily relin-
quish that citizenship if they do not wish to be subject to this inherent power.
Riley, supra note 204, at 816.
291. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 4, at 1107 (“[T]he U.S. government continues, in a
variety of ways, to undermine or altogether sabotage the survival of indigenous
nations in America,” yet “Indian tribes in a contemporary world are in a position
to more fully consider their obligations to their citizens”).
2019] TRIBAL DISENROLLMENT 859
the community.292 Sovereigns, including tribal nations, have no power
to revoke citizenship;293 to do so would be to impose a “form of punish-
ment more primitive than torture.”294 At the same time, removing
congressional limitations on incarceration and fines directly supports
tribal sovereignty295 by restoring tribes’ inherent power to resolve
problems internally.296 It allows tribes to address criminal conduct in
whatever manner they believe is most appropriate as long as the sanc-
tion is not a cruel and unusual punishment. This solution also ex-
changes a nuclear weapon in the fight against reservation crime—
disenrollment—for a much more targeted and appropriate weapon: re-
turning inherent tribal criminal authority over members and leaving
it up to the individual tribal member to assess the relative value of
tribal community.
292. Disenrolling a tribal citizen for criminal conduct would also divest tribes of the
ability to prosecute that individual for future crimes, potentially exacerbating the
problem. See, e.g., WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 2, at 135–36.
293. Galanda & Dreveskratch, supra note 136, at 389 (arguing that “disenrollment is
antithetical to tribal sovereignty”).
294. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). As noted earlier, the “political existence”
of Native Americans has been developing far longer than that of the colonists.
295. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN.
L. REV. 777, 784–86 (2006) (pointing out that “real self-determination has not
been—and cannot be—achieved until tribes can determine for themselves what is
right and what is wrong on their own reservations and in human transactions
involving their own members” and that “they must have the power to enact sub-
stantive criminal laws” rather than be bound “to rules and value judgments im-
posed on them by outsiders”—namely, the federal government).
296. Restoring tribes’ inherent authority furthers tribal interests. See, e.g., Laurie
Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing Parameters of State,
Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM & MARY L. REV. 539, 542 (1997) (arguing
in the civil context that “refocusing the inquiry to require careful analysis of rele-
vant tribal interests can produce a more reasoned allocation of adjudicatory juris-
diction,” which will ensure “a more faithful adherence to well-established judicial
doctrines respecting inherent tribal sovereignty and tribal self-determination”).
In addition, removing disenrollment as an option affirms tribal sovereignty and
should appeal to tribal leaders (in addition to those interested in protecting indi-
vidual rights) because of the harms to tribal identity as a whole and governance
that come with disenrollment.
